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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DELORES PETERSON,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,

'I
Case
No. 7419

-vs.-

SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendant and Respondent.

1

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since we cannot fully agree with the statement of
facts given by plaintiff in her brief, we shall make our
own statement.
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On December 4, 1947 plaintiff filed the following
letter with the Recorder of Salt Lake City (R. :P· 9-11,
p. 17-19):
''Salt Lake City, Utah
December 2, 1947
TO: THE MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSION
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
Gentlemen:
On November 14 1947 on Fourth South
Street between 8th an'd 9th 'west Streets, I was
walking on the sidewalk going west toward my
h?me, this was after dark at night. Along the
Sl~ewalk Salt Lake City had ·permitted a corner
tnangle to be broken out of the paved sidewalk
the full depth of the pavement. It is apparent
that the break had been there for a considerable
length of time as the broken out piece could not
be found in the vicinity. The broken out portion
of the sidewalk was in a triangular shape extending approximately one foot in toward the center
of the sidewalk and one foot along the north side
of the sidewalk. The walk was dark so that the
damaged portion thereof could not be seen while
walking on the sidewalk, and as I walked toward
my home on the sidewalk, I stepped into the hole
and my foot sunk into the mud in the bottom of
the hole over my shoe causing me to fall and as
a result of the fall my leg was broken in four
places.
·
By reason of the above, I herewith submit to
your Honorable Body my bill for damages as a
result of the fall in the .sum of $7,500.00, and
re9uest that the same be paid forthwith Your
fa1lure to comply with this request will necess1
· 'ta t.e
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me bringing an action against the municipality
for the collection of my damages.
Hereof fail not, or it will be necessary that

I take due course of law concerning this matter.
IS/ Dolores Peterson
E. LeRoy Shields,
Attorney for Claimant
Received a copy of the above notice, claim
and demand, this 4th day of December, 1947.

/8/ Irma F. Bitner
Clerk of Salt Lake City
B. Judges''

---

~,.-,-.

Plaintiff commenced this action March 3, 1948 ( R.
p. 1). In her original complaint (R. p. 1) she failed to
allege that she had filed a claim as required in Section
15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943. A demurrer to her complaint was
sustained (R. p. 6). An amended complaint was then
filed on May 4, 1948 (R. p. 7), to which was attached as
exhibit "A" the letter above set out (R. p. 11). A demurrer to this complaint was sustained (R. p. 14). On
May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed with the City Recorder another claim (R. p. 17, paragraph 4 Second Amended
Complaint), bearing date of December 2, 1947, but subscribed and sworn to May 22, 1948 (R. p. 20), amended
claim exhibit ''B.'' At the to:p of this claim appear the
words, ''Amended Claim.'' The language of the body
of this "Amended Claim" is identical with that of the
first claim, above set out, except that it is attempted to
be drawn in affidavit form by stating the venue and
stating it is subscribed and sworn to, and except furSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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On December 4, 1947 plaintiff filed the following
letter with the Recorder of Salt Lake City (R. ·P· 9-11,
p.17-19):
"Salt Lake City, Utah
December 2, 1947
TO:

THE MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSION
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Gentlemen:
On November 14, 1947, on Fourth South
Street between 8th and 9th West Streets, I was
walking on the sidewalk going west toward my
home, this was after dark at night. Along the
sidewalk Salt Lake City had :permitted a corner
triangle to he broken out of the paved sidewalk
the full depth of the pavement. It is apparent
that the break had been there for a considerable
length of time as the broken out piece could not
be found in the vicinity. The broken out portion
of the sidewalk was in a triangular shape extending approximately one foot in toward the center
of the sidewalk and one foot along the north side
of the sidewalk. The walk was dark so that the
damaged portion thereof could not be seen while
walking on the sidewalk, and as I walked toward
my home on the sidewalk, I stepped into the hole
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the hole over my shoe causing me to fall and as
a result of the fall my leg was broken in four
places.
By reason of the above, I herewith submit to
your Honorable Body my bill for damages as a
result of the fall in the sum of $7 ,500.00, and
request that the same be paid forthwith. Your
failure to comply with this request will necessitate
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me bringing an action against the municipality
for the collection of my damages.
Hereof fail not, or it will be necessary that
I take due course of law concerning this matter.

!8/ Dolores Peterson
E. LeRoy Shields,
Attorney for Claimant
Received a copy of the above notice, claim
and demand, this 4th day of December, 1947.

/8/ Irma F. Bitner
Clerk of Salt Lake City
B. Judges"
Plaintiff commenced this action March 3, 1948 (R.
p. 1). In her original complaint (R. p. 1) she failed to
allege that she had filed a claim as required in Section
15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943. A demurrer to her complaint was
sustained (R. p. 6). An amended complaint was then
filed on May 4, 1948 (R. p. 7), to which was attached as
exhibit "A" the letter above set out (R. p. 11). A demurrer to this complaint was sustained (R. p. 14). On
May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed with the City Recorder another claim (R. p. 17, paragraph 4 Second Amended
Complaint), bearing date of December 2, 1947, but subscribed and sworn to May 22, 1948 (R. p. 20), amended
claim exhibit ''B.'' At the top of this claim appear the
words, ''Amended Claim.'' The language of the body
of this "Amended Claim" is identical with that of the
first claim, above set out, except that it is attempted to
be drawn in affidavit form by stating the venue and
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ther that the original claim states, "the walk was dark
so that the damaged portion thereof could not be seen
while walking on the sidewalk.'' Whereas, the amended
claim states, ''it was very dark and the damaged portion of the sidewalk could not be seen while walking on
the sidewalk." (R. p. 19-20) It is apparent that whether
the walk itself was so dark that the damaged ·portion
could not be seen or whether the night was dark so that
the damaged portion could not be seen could very
readily involve a substantial difference in the issues
that might be framed, especially on contributory negligence.
On June 3, 1948 plaintiff filed her second amended
complaint. This complaint alleges (R. p. 17, paragraph
4 of complaint) the filing of the claim above quoted on
December 4, 1947, attached as exhibit "A,., and that
more than 30 days elapsed after its filing during which
time the Mayor and City Commission failed and neglected to approve said claim and such failure was tantamount to its refusal to allow such claim. Then it is
alleged that on May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed her amended
claim, a copy of which is attached as exhibit ''B.''
From the foregoing it is apparent that the claim
filed with the City Recorder May 27, 1948, more than
6 months after the accident, is not merely an amendment to the original claim. It was filed nearly 3 months
after this action was commenced and after the City
Commission had refused to allow the original claim. It
did not add a verification to the original claim. If it had
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the legal effect of amending the original claim, then it
would be a substitute therefor and should be the clain1
to be rejected by the City Commission before action
could be brought thereon. It was in fact a new, separate
and independent claim, but filed out of time and, therefore, a nullity.
Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's second amended
complaint was sustained (R. p. 26) and judgment of
dismissal entered July 15, 1949 (R. p. 27), it appearing
to the court that the defect in the complaint could not
be corrected.
POINTS IN ISSUE
It appears to us that there are 3 points in issue in
this appeal :
I. Must a claim for damages against the City
arising out of a defective sidewalk be verified to be
legally effective.
II. Can the plaintiff, after commencing her action,
based upon the filing and rejection of an unverified
claim, and after the time for filing a claim has expired,
substitute for the original claim another claim containing a verification.
III. Is the place of accident designated with sufficient particularity in the claim to meet the requirements of Section 15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943 when it merely
states that, ''on November 14, 1947 on Fourth South
Street between 8th and 9th West Street I was walking
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on the sidewalk going west toward my home,'' and
described the broken portion as being triangular in
shape, ''extending approximately one foot in towar.:l
the center of the sidewalk and one foot along the north
side of the sidewalk.''
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE CITY, ARISING OUT OF A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK, MUST BE VERIFIED TO BE LEGALLY EFFECTIVE UNDER SECTIONS
15-7-76 AND 15-7-77, U.C.A. 1943.

This question was settled by this court in the case
of Hamilton vs. Salt Lake City, 99 U. 362, 106 P. 2d
1028. In that case a letter was sent to the City Commission with no verification, claiming damages arising
from falling on a defective sidewalk. The same statutory provisions were involved in that case as are here
involved. For the convenience of the court we quote
these provisions.
Section 15-7-76:
''Every claim against a city or incorporated
town for dam·ages or injury, alleged to have been
caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or
obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city or
town, or from the negligence of the city or town
authorities in respect to any such street, alley,
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crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty days after the happening of such injury
or damage be presented to the board of commissioners or city council of such city, or board of
trustees of such town, in writing, signed by the
claimant or by some person authorized to sign
the san1e, and properly verified, stating the particular time at which the injury happened, and
designating and describing the particular place
in which it occured, and also particularly describing the cause and circumstances of the injury or
damages, and stating, if known to claimant, the
name of the person, firm or corporation, who
created, brought about or maintained the defect,
obstruction or condition causing such accident or
injury, and the nature and probable extent of such
injury, and the amount of damages claimed on
account of the same; such notice shall be sufficient in the particulars above specified to enahle
the officers of such city or town to find the place
and cause of such injury from the description
thereof given in the notice itself without extraneous inquiry, and no action shall be maintained
against any city or town for damages or injury
to person or property, unless it appears that the
claim for which the action was brought was presented as aforesaid, and that such governing body
did not within ninety days thereafter audit and
allow the same. Every claim, other than claims
above mentioned, against any city or town must
be presented, properly itemized or described and
verified as to correctness by the claimant or his
agent, to the governing body within one year
after the last item of such account or clairn
accrued, and if such acount or claim is not properly or sufficiently itemized or described or verified, the governing body may require the same
to be made more specific as to itemization or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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description, or to be corrected as to the verification thereof.''
Section 15-7-77 :
''It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to
any action or proceeding against a city or town
in any court for the collection of any claim mentioned' in section 15-7-76, that such claim had not
been fJ'ff"esented to the governing body of such city
or town in the manner and within the time specified in section 15-7-76 ; provided, that in case an
account or claim, otheT than a claim made for
damages on acount of the unsafe, defective, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street,
alley, crosswalk, way, sidewalk, culvert or bridge,
is required by the governing body to be made
more specific as to itemization or description, or
to be properly verified, sufficient time shall be
allowed the claimant to comply with such requirement.''
In the Hamilton case the court points out that Section 15-7-76 describes two types of claims which may
be filed against the city. One is for defective, unsafe
or obstructed condition of any street or sidewalk, etc.,
and the second covers all claims other than those just
mentioned. By the terms of Section 15-7-77 it is a sufficient bar and answer to any :action for the collection
of any claim under the first part of the statute that a
claim had not been filed, "in the manner and within the
time specified in Section 15-7-76."
The court then says : ''Under the second
part of the section if the claimant is required by
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the governing body to be more specific as to
itemization or description, or if the claim is not
properly verified, sufficient time shall be allowed
to comply with such requirements. No provision
is made for the governing body to make such a
requirement from a claimant under the first part
of the section. See Husband Y. Salt Lake City,
92 Utah 449, 69 P. 2d 491, at page 497.
"The right to recover damages is statutory,
it can only be availed of when there has been a
compliance with the conditions upon which the
right is conferred. Hurley v. Town of Bingham,
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. Where a right is purely
statutory and is granted upon conditions, one
who seeks to enforce the right must by allegation
and proof bring himself within the conditions.
Johnson v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d
389, 55 p. 2d 580.
''The California District Court of Appeals,
Second District, had this to say in a case where
injury had occurred upon a sidewalk and where
a ''verified claim for damages shall be presented
in writing and filed with the clerk * * * '' St. Cal.
1931, p. 2475, Section 1. ''It is the generally
accepted rule that a municipality and its officers
are without 1lower to waive compliance with the
law in such matters. Chapman v. City of Fullerton, 90 Cal. App. 463, 265 P. 1035; Spencer v.
City of Calipatria, supra (9 Cal. App. 2d 267,
49 P. 2d 320); Touhey v. City of Decatur, supra
(175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540, 32 L. R. A., N. S., 350);
Dechant v. City of Hays, 112 Kan. 729, 212 P. 682 ;
Berry v. City of Helena, 56 Mont. 122, 182 p. 117.
The statute does not authorize a waiver nor does
it provide any substitute for a written verified
claim. The authorities we have cited quite generally hold that actual knowledge on the part of
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officers of municipality of the facts required to be
stated in the claim does not dispense with the
claim itself. In view of our holding that the city
could not be bo111nd by a;ny alleged waiver, consisting as it would of an extension of time for
filing the claim, it is unnecessary to point out
the particulars in which the complaint failed to
show any authority on the part of defendants
Curl and M~acintyre to represent or act for the
'City except in the mere matter of the investigation
of plaintiff's injuries and the cause thereof.''
(Italics added.) Johnson v. City of Glendale
et al., supra (12 Cal. App. 2d 389, 55 P. 2d 583).
"The above quoted case states in another portion of the opinion: 'The 1931 act requires presentation of a verified claim to the clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the municipality
or other governing board within ninety days
after the accident has occured. It states no exceptions, and we are unable to believe that any were
intended. If there were to be exceptions, they
s,hould have been stated in the act itself. It is not
for the courts to create them. It must be presumed that the Legislature would have made
disability an excuse for failure to present a claim
had it been intended to grant that privilege.
There is nothing novel in this class of legislation.
Wherever liability of municipalities for negligence is recognized, general l~aws, ·charter provisions, or ordinances will be found imposing
conditions upon the assertion of claims for damages, and many such are discussed in the books
which are far more rigorous than our own statute.' (Italics added.)"
In Johnson v. City of Olendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 389,
55 P. 2d 583, quoted in the Hamilton case, the plaintiff
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did not file her claim until 5 n1onths after the accident
occurred ·while the statute required it to be filed within
90 days. Plaintiff soug·ht to justify her failure to file
within the 90 days by alleging her injuries were such
that she was incapacitated for n1ore than 3 months and
so could not file "'IYithin the time limit. The court first
held that the right of recovery was purely statutory
and compliance with the statute relative to filing a
claim within a specified ti1ne was mandatory. It then
said: •'\Yhere a right is purely statutory and is permitted upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the
right must by allegation and proof clearly bring himself within the conditions.''
''The statute does not authorize a waiver nor does
it provide any substitute for a written verified claim.''
Caron vs. Grays Harbor Co1vnty, 18 Wash. 2d. 397,
139 P. 2d 626. Plaintiff while working as an abstractor
and looking at records in the county clerk's office was
injured when she fell from a defective ladder which
was provided for use in getting to the files. The statute
governing the filing of claims against the county provided that the claim must be presented within 60 days
after the time when such claim or damages accrue, ''all
such claims must locate and describe the defect whicn
caused the injury and contain the amount of damages

claimed ... and be sworn to by the claimant. No action
shall be maintained for any claim for damages until
the same has been presented to the board of county commissioners and 60 days have elapsed after such :presenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tation." The claim filed in this case did not describe the
defect which caused the defect, merely stating that the
filing case failed to hold causing the ladder to slip and
claimant to fall. Neither did the claim state the amount
of damages claimed. The court held that compliance
with the claim statute was a condition precedent to the
maintenance of an action, stating:
''The inescapable logic of these rules, as
just stated, when taken together is that substantial ~compliance with the statute is a condition
precedent to the maintenance of an action for
damages ag-ainst the municipality; or, expressed
in another way, the filing of a claim that does not
substantially comply with the statute has the same
legal effect as the failure to file any claim at all."
The court further held that the filing of a proper
claim could not be waived and that the action of the
county commissioners in advising claimant that the
claim was sufficient could not be binding upon the
county. Among the cases cited is the case of Hamilton
v. Salt Lake City, supra.

Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal. A:pp. 2d. 267,
49 P. 2d 320. The statute required the filing of a verified claim. The claimant alleged that a written claim
was delivered to the Board of Trustees of defendant
city setting forth the injuries sustained and how and
where the same were sustained and demanding compensation for his injuries. It was not verified, however, but
plaintiffs alleged that they had been led to believe that
no verification was necessary, and the claim as presented
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was satisfactory. The city demurred to the complaint,
which demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.
The appellate court a:ffinned the ruling, holding that a
lack of verification could not be waiYed by the city,
saying:
'• ~ ot only is the filing of an unverified claim
not substantial compliance with the statute requiring that a verified claim be filed but in two recent
cases, it has been held that the provisions of the
two statutes here in question are mandatory and
must be complied with in order to lay the foundation for an action. Thompson v. County of
Los Angeles 140 Cal. App. 73,35 P. 2d 185. Myers
v. Hopland Union Elementary School District
of Mendocino County, 44 P. 2d '654. No right to
bring such an action exists independent of statute enactment and, in giving such a right, the
legislature may prescribe the procedure and conditions under which it may be exercised. That
such a claim must be verified is a reasonable
provision which should not be held to be ineffectual and meaningless.''
Douglas v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 123, 53 P.
2d 353. The Supreme Court of California expressly
affirms the doctrine stated in Spencer v. Calipatria,
supra, as follows :

"It must inevitably follow that if a claimant
in this state is to obtain redress against the city
for injuries received by reason of the negligent
acts or omissions of its servants such claimant
must rest upon the liability imposed by the general statute and must conform with the requirements of that statute in enforcing that liability.
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One of the requirements of the general statute
since 1931 has been that as a prerequisite to suit
to enforce sueh liability against the city, the
claimant must have filed with the clerk of
the legislative body of the city, here the city
council, a verified claim for damages. St. 1931,
page 2475; St. 1931 page 2477. In the recent case
of Spencer v. City of Calipatria (Cal. App.) 49
P. 2d 320 it was held that the provision of the
statute in question requiring the filing of a
verified claim is mandatory, that the city could
not waive the requirement as a prerequisite to
suit, and that the filing of an unverified claim was
ineffectual. A petition for a hearing in this court
in that case was denied on November 22, 1935.
The holding therein made is hereby declared to
be the law in all cases coming within its purview.''

Cooper v. Butte County, 17 Cal. App. 2d 43, 61 P.
2d 516, cited and relied upon in the Hamilton case, reiterates the legal propositions stated in California cases
above referred to.
The statute involved in the California cases above
cited, being act 5149, Deerings General Law, 1931, St.
1931 C. 1167, page 2475, provides as follows:
"Whenever it is claimed that any person
has been injured or any person damaged as a
result of the dangerous or defective condition of
any public street, highway, building, park, grounds,
works or property, a verified claim for damages
shall be presented in writing and filed with the
clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the
municipality, county, city and county, or school
district ,as the case may be, within 90 days after
such accident has occured. Such claim shall spe-
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cify the name and address of the claimant, the
date and place of the accident and the extent of
the injuries or damages received.''
Chapman v. Fullerton, 90 Cal. App. 463, 265 P. 1035.

Here the board of trustees of the city a'Pproved the
claim and ordered a warrant drawn on the city treasurer
in payn1ent thereof. The clain1 was not verified and was
not itemized. The clairn ordinance adopted pursuant to
statutory authorization provided:
''X o demand against the city of Fullerton
shall be allowed by the Board of Trustees . . . .
unless the claimant shall have filed with the clerk
his itemized demand in writing, giving the date
and services rendered, the character of the work
done and number of days engaged therein . . . .
which claims must be verified by affidavit of the
claimant or some competent person for him.'' etc.
A taxpayer brought an action to enjoin the officers
of the city from paying the claim. The court enjoined
payment of the warrant saying:
''True, the allowance of claims should be
sustained in certain instances where it is apparent
that the claimant has endeavored to itemize the
same, and as the appellant contends, under some
circumsta~ces the question of the sufficiency of
the itemization is one for the board to determine;
but here as will be noted, no attempt whatever
wa~ mad~ to itemize the claim, and, not being
subscribed or sworn to as required by the ordinance did not constitute even a skeleton claim.''

'
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Nibloak v. Salt Lake City, 100 U. 573, 111 P. 2d 800.
While this case did not involve the question of failure
to file a verified claim, the following language from the
opinion is pertinent:
"This court is comitted to the doctrine that
the duty to repair or construct streets within its
corporate limits is a governmental one and that
in the absence of a statute no liability devolves
on a municipality for the defective condition of
its streets. Hurley vs. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah
589, 228 P. 2d 213; Hamilton vs. Salt Lake City,
106 P. 2d 1028. As stated in Hurley vs. Town of
B'£ng,ham, supra, 'The right to institute an action
in this class of cases (an injury caused by an
obstruction) is purely statutory. It did not exist
at common law, and therefore the conditions
precedent fixed by the statute which confers the
right must be complied with, or the action fails."
One of the conditions fixed by the statute is that
the claim must be verified. The language of the statute
is clear on this point. That the verification is an essential prerequisite to the validity of a claim based upon a
defective or dangerous street or sidewalk is further
emphasized when it appears, in other provisions of the
statute, that the verification may be waived as to all
other claims. If the verification may not be waived by
the city, as is held by our court and the other authorities above cited, it must be because verification is an
essential prerequisite to a legal claim. In other word~,
an unverified claim has no efficacy. Filing such a claim
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does not place any obligation on the part of the city to
art thereon. It is the same as filing no claim at all.
POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF, AFTER COMMENCING HER ACTION, BASED UPON THE FILING AND REJECTION OF
AN UNVERIFIED CLAIM, AND AFTER THE TIME FOR
FILING A CLAIM HAS EXPIRED, MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE ORIGINAL ANOTHER CLAIM CONTAINING A
VERIFICATION.

Of course, plaintiff asserts that the filing of the
second claim constituted an amendment of the first claim
by merely adding a verification. "\Ve submit, as already
pointed out, the second claim was not an amended clain1
but was a separate, independent claim. The first clai111
had no life or efficacy, lacking a verification. It was
not amended by adding a verification thereto. An entirely new claim was filed when it appeared :plaintiff
had no cause of action because of the invalidity of the
first claim. If the filing of a verified claim is a condition
precedent to the bringing and maintenance of an action
against the city, as is clearly held by the authorities
already cited, that condition may not be supplied months
after the action is commenced. The cause of action must
be determined by the status of the conditions as they
existed when the action is commenced. Furthermore,
under the claim statute, after the 30 days allowed for
the filing of the claim had elapsed, the right to file a
claim has also expired. The right of action on the claim
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must be measured by the status of the claim as it existed
at the expiration of the 30-day period. These conclusions are abundantly supported by the authorities cited
under Point I. In addition we cite the following:
Berry v. City of Helena, 56 Mont. 122, 182 P. 177.

Here the statute required filing a notice of injury within
60 days after the injury, said no tic€' to contain, ''the
time when and the place where said injury is alleged
to have occurred.'' The notice filed stated the injury
occurred January 22, 1916, whereas the evidence showed

it occurred January 24, 1916. Because of this variance
the notice was not admitted in evidence. On appeal by
the plaintiff the court says:
''Before any liability whatever attaches for
injuries resulting from defective streets or sidewalks, the city must have received a notice prescribed by section 3289 above. That section is
not in any sense a statute of limitation. Its provisions cannot be waived for they are intended for
the benefit of the public whose money must be
appropriated to the :payment for any damages
recovered''....
"The statute means just what it says. The
notice must state the time when the injuries were
received, and since our Code takes no account
of the fractional parts of a day in a case of this
character, the notice must state the day upon
whi·ch it is claimed that the accident occurred.
The statute prescribes no particular form of
notice, and mere informalities would not vitiate
a notice, but the statement of the time and place
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of the accident is n1ade a matter of substance, not
merely a matter of form, and the courts are not
authorized to change the statute.
It is not an answer to say that the city
officials obtained correct information from other
sources and were not misled. The only right
which plaintiff can assert against the city is the
right granted by statute. Compliance with the
law on her part i8- a necessary prerequisite to her
right to institute this action, and an appropriate
allegation of such compliance is an indispensable
part of the statement of a cause of action.
Xeither can appellant invoke the aid of section 6585, Revised Codes. The reason for the
rule there announced arises out of our liberal
Practice Act ·and the very generous statutes of
amendment. But while pleadings may be amended
at any time, even after verdict and judgment
(Leggat v. Palmer, 39 Mont. 302, 102 Pac. 327),
the notice required by section 3289 is not subject
to amendment. At the expiration of the time
limited by that section, the claimant is bound by
the notice he has served, and his right to institute
an action is to be tested by such notice.''

Cotriss v. Village of Medina, 124 N. Y. S. 507, Aff.
206 N. Y. 713, 99 N. E. 1105. The claim statute provided
that, "all claims for damages or injury alleged to have
arisen from the defective, unsafe, dangerous obstructed
condition of any street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk, ... shall within 6 months after the happening of
such damage or injury, be presented to the board of
trustees of said village in writing signed by the claimant and properly verified by him, describing the time,
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place, cause and condition of the damage or injury,
and the omission to present such claim as aforesaid
within said time shall be a bar to any action or proceeding against said village." Plaintiff was injured and
filed a written but unverified claim. The only question
presented, as the court said, is whether the lack of verification rendered it a nullity. The court says:
''The Legislature, in prescribing the form
of the writing to be presented to the board of
trustees in order to advise that body of the time,
place, and cause of the injuries asserted to be
sustained by the claimant, has definitely required
that it be "properly verified by him," and that
requirement is accordingly one of the essential
elements of the writing. Patterson v. City of
Brooklyn, 6 App. DiY. 127, 40 N. Y. Supp. 581.
The verification of a notice of this kind is required in most of the charters of villages and cities,
and is a wise precaution against the presentation
of fictitious or exaggerated claims. If the claimant verifies a claim which contains material false
statements intentionally made they may be the
foundation of an indictment for perjury. If the
statement is verified, the claimant will be inclined
to be :precise and accur~ate in setting forth the
facts which, it is alleged, establish the liability of
the municipality.
The language of this charter provision is
explicit in its declaration that "the omission to
present such claim as aforesaid within said time
shall be a bar to ~any action * * * against the
village." It would seem plain that the service of
the written notice properly verified by the
claimant is a condition precedent to the bringing
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of the action. The statute does not state in so
many words that the writing must be delivered
to the board prior to the commencement of the
action, but as the omission to present is "a bar
to any ·action or proceeding" the inference is irresistible that its presentation in substantially
the form prescribed must be made before the
cause of action n1atures. Certainly a notice such
as the statute prescribes presented after the complaint is served would be a useless formality. The
authorities, as I read them, pretty well agree that
the service of the written statement, in form substantially complying with the charter regulation,
is a necessary preliminary to the commencement
of the action against the municipality.''
''The respondent contends that, inasmuch as
the complaint was verified with the statement annexed and presented within the six months prescribed, the charter provision has been substantially complied with. If the service of the written
verified statement is a condition precedent to the
commencement of the action, then the fact of
such service must be accomplished before the
summons or complaint is served at all, and must
be alleged in the complaint.''
''The retention of the written statement by
the board of trustees was not a waiver of the
omission to verify it. Forsyth v. City of Oswego,
191 N. Y. 441, 84 N. E. 392, 123 Am. St. Pre. 605;
Purdy v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 521, 524,
86 N. E. 560, et seq. It may be that the omission
to present the pro:per writing or statement to the
board did not result in any damage to the defendant. That is not the test. The requirement
is absolute, and the question of whether injury
resulted from the failure to comply with the
explicit mandate of the statute is not open to
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proof or inquiry. If so, these and similar provisions intended to safeguard municipalities against
the imposition of unjust claims would be nullified.''
"Nor do I think the contention of the counsel
for the respondent that the service of the complaint duly verified by the plaintiff, with a copy
of the written statement attached, meets the provisions of the statute is well founded, inasmuch
as the service of the written statement is a condition precedent to the bringing of the action.
The :pith of the statute is that the service of the
statement must precede the bringing of the action,
and this essential requirement is not met if a
copy €>f the notice is annexed to the complaint
and served with it and comprises the only service made.
The plaintiff apparently has a meritorious
claim on the merits. It is unfortunate for her
that she may be defeated in the action by reason
of the failure to present a statement, properly
verified, to the trustees of the defendant. TQe
provision quoted from section 30 of the charter
of the defendant is similar to those contained in
many village and city charters. It will not do to
impair the intended purpose of this provision in
order to enable the plaintiff to succeed in what
may be a just claim. These provisions are salutary and readily to be comprehended. Their effect should not be weakened by decisions of the
courts made in order to extenuate or help out
claimants who have omitted to conform to requirements which are indispensable preliminaries
to the maintenance of an action."

Balding v. Park Planes Corporation, 70 N. Y. S. 2d
181. The notice of claim was served on the city within
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the statutory 6-month period. It described the place of
the accident as being the southeast corner of Union
Post Road and East Tremont Avenue. :More than a
year later. by notice of such, plaintiff nwved for an
order amending the notice of claim, nunc pro tunc, to
designate the southwest corner of Union Post Road and
East Tremont ~-\xenue instead of the southeast corner.
The decision is stated in the head note as follo\vs:
''Notice of claim against city for damages for
injuries sustained because of defective sidewalks
could not be amended after time for filing of
claim had expired, to change description of place
of defect from southeast corner of certain intersection to southwest corner.''
Rozell v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 864. We
quote from the decision as follows :

''Action by plaintiff wife to recover damages
for personal injuries and by her husband for
medical expenses and loss of service, the description of the alleged defective part of the sidewalk
as 'on east side of Troy Avenue between Prospect Place and Park Place in borough of Brooklyn City and State of New York,' was vague and
rendered the notice of intention to sue fatally
defective.
In consequence and in absence of timely service of a valid notice, the right to sue the municipality terminated 6 months after the happening of the accident."
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POINT III.
THE PLACE OF ACCIDENT IS NOT DESIGNATED
WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY IN THE CLAIM TO
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 15-7-76, U.C.A.
1943.

The only description of the place of the accident
given in either notice of claim is that it was on Fourth
South Street between 8th and 9th West Street. The
defect is described as a triangular hole extending about
a foot in toward the center of the walk and being one
foot along the north side of the sidewalk. Plaintiff wa~
walking west. It is apparent that the defect may have
been either in the north sidewalk or the south sidewalk
and it may have been at any :place between 8th and 9th
West Streets. Plaintiff cites and relies on the case of
Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479. At
the time the Connor case was decided the claim statute,
Section 312, R. S. 1898, provided as follows :
''All claims against a city or town for damages or injury alleged to have arisen from the
defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, or bridge of such city or town or from
the negligence of the city or town authorities in
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge, shall, within ninety days
after the hap:pening of such injury or damage,
be presented to the city council of such city or
board of trustees of such town in writing, signed
by the claimant or by some authorized person,
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and properly verified, describing the time, place,
cause, and extent of the damage or injury; and
no action shall be maintained .against any city or
town as aforesaid for injuries to person or property, unless it appears that the claim for which
the action was brought was presented to the
council as aforesaid, and that the council or board
did not, "ithin ninety days thereafter, audit and
allow the same.''
Since that tin1e the statute has been amended requiring ''designating and describing the particular
place" and that "such notice shall be sufficient in the
particulars above specified to enable the officers of
such city or town to find the place and cause of such
injury from the description thereof given in the notice
itself without extraneous inquiry, and no action shall
be maintained ... unless it appears that the claim was
presented as aforesaid.'' Section 15-7-77 further provides that it shall be a sufficient bar to an action ~f
the claim is not presented in the manner prescribed by
Section 15-7-76.
The court in the Connor case took the view that in
determining the sufficiency of the notice it was not
bound by the terms of the notice alone, but could examine it in the light of ''extraneous evidence showing
the situation and surroundings to determine whether it
sufficiently apprised the municipality of the location
and nature of the alleged defect." Under the present
law the court is expressly denied the right to consider
extraneous evidence. The notice itself must specify the
particular place so that from such specification alone
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the city officers can find the place without resort to any
extraneous evidence.
The difference in the 1898 statute and the present
statute is referred to in Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43
Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 as follows:

-'

"From an examination of the Mackay case
(Mackay v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 247, 81 P. 81,
decided after the Connor case) and the cases
there cited, it will at once be seen that the statute
in its present form, and which controls the case
at bar, is very different from what it was when
the Mackay case and the Bowman case were decided.''
In Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233,
13 A. L. R. 5; this court also refers to the changes in
the statute made since the Mackay case ·was decided
saying:
''After that case was decided, however, the
statute was amended so as to require the claimant to state the amount of damages that he
claimed. It would, therefore, be folly to contenci
that by the amendments to the statutes no change
was intended or effected.''
It is clear, therefore, that the Connor case is without any controlling or even persuasive influence in the
present case in view of the change made in the statute
above referred to since the Connor case was decided.
That the description of the place of the accident in the
claim here involved is too vague and indefinite to satisfy
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the claim statute is supported by the following authorities:

Village of Dazcson v. Estrop, 243 Ill. App. 55:2. The
statute required the notice of claim to state •'the place
or location where such accident occurred.'' The claiin
filed for injuries due to a fall on a defective sidewalk
stated that plaintiff fell by reason of the dangerous condition of said side,valk "running along and at a :point
to the east of the property owned by one Fannie ~fiers. ''
The court held the claim fatally defective saying:
"There is nothing in the notice to indicate
where, with reference to the sidewalk the property of Fannie Miers is situated, nor how far
east of her property the :point is where the accident happened. 'To be legally sufficient, a notice
of this kind must contain a sufficiently definite
description of the place of the accident to enable
the interested parties to identify it from the
notice itself. .All of the specific requirements of
.statutes of this character are mandatory, and the
giving of the notice is a condition precedent to
the right to bring suit, and to recover damages,
and the giving of the notice must be averred and
proved by plaintiff to avoid a dismissal of his
suit'."
Rozell v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 864. We

quote as follows from the opinion:
''The description of the alleged defective p.art
of the sidewalk as 'on east side of Troy Avenue
between Prospect Place and Park Place, in the
borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New
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York,' was vague and rendered the notice of intention to sue fatally defective. (citing cases) In
consequence, and in the absence of timely service
of a valid notice, a right to sue the municipality
terminated six months after the happening of the
accident, or in October of 1944. The remedy was
not revived thereafter, so as to enable :plaintiffs
to amend the notice, by reason of the enactment
of laws of 1945, Chapter 694. The right to sue a
municipality, limited by such conditions precedent
as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe cannot be held to have been revived unless, at least,
the Legislature unmistakably has so provided.''
Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196 Ill. App. 83. The
statute required the notice of claim to state the place or
location where such accident occurred. The claim recited that "said hole (in sidewalk) being located upon
the west side of LaSalle Street between North Avenue
and Washington Street, and opposite Jennings Seminary, in the City aforesaid." The court says:
''In the area of sidewalk covered by the description, there may have been a large number
of holes. To be legally sufficient, a notice of this
kind must contain a sufficiently definite description of the place of the accident to enable the
interested parties to identify it from the notice
itself."
The court held that for failure to give notice required
by law the plaintiff had no cause of action against the
City.
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Fan Hovenburg v. City of
888. The court says:

Ne1i)

York, 144 N. Y. S.

''A notice of an injury sustained on a sidewalk which specified that while plaintiff was
walking on the left hand side of Euclid Avenue
in the direction of Liberty Street she was injured about 100 feet from Liberty Street is insufficient because not stating where the injury
occurred; there being two left hand sides of the
street dependent entirely on the direction in which
the person is proceeding.''
Casey v. City of New York, 217 N.Y. 192, 111 N. E.

764. The statute required that a notice of intention to
commence an action be filed giving ''the time and place
at which the injuries were received within six months
after the cause of action accrued." The notice stated
that the accident happened at a "hole in the pavement
on the public highway at about Washington Street near
Vestry Street in the Borough of Manhattan in the City
of New York.'' The court says :
"This notice is so vague and indefinite as to
be almost meaningless. Where is 'at about Washington Street, near Vestry~' It is in Washington
Street and on which side of Vestry Street, and
how near to Vestry Street~ The word 'near'
means 'not distant from,' but the term is wholly
relative and locates nothing with any degree
of precision; no one could from the notice locate
the place with accuracy.
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The city had no difficulty in finding the spot
where :plaintiff fell and making its measurements soon after the accident, and, as the first
purpose of the statute is to enable the city to
conduct its investigations intelligently, it is urged
that the notice, vague as it is, is definite enough
to serve the purpose in this case. The city is
entitled to know, not alone where the accident
in fact happened, but also where the injured
person claims that it happened. The two points
are not necessarily and invariably identical, and
the rule requiring a particular location to be
~stated in the notice should not be greatly relaxed
merely because the conjectures of the city officials
as to its meaning prove accurate. Plaintiff has
failed to prove the service of a proper notice.''

WI

\i11

POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF ARGUES THAT THE MAINTENANCE AND
REPAIR OF STREETS IS A CORPORATE AND NOT :A
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION AND HENCE THE CLAIM
STATUTE SHOULD BE SO LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AS
TO PERMIT A CLAIM TO BE VERIFIED AT ANY TIME.

r~ui

~ucn

To establish her premise in the foregoing pro:position, plaintiff asks this court to overrule its decisions
in at least three cases, Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63
Utah 589, 222 P. 231; Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99
Utah 3:62, 106 P. 2d 1028; and Niblock v. Salt Lake City,
100 Utah 573, 111 P. 2d 800. In all of these cases this
court held that the "duty to repair and construct streets
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within its corporate limits is a governmental one and
in the absence of a statute no liability devolves on a
municipality for the defective condition of its streets."
The essence of plaintiff's argument is this, the court
went off half cocked in the Hurley case laying down a
legal proposition without any legal support; that since
then this court in the Hamilton and Niblock cases has
twice perpetuated the error without considering what
it was doing or the flimsy basis upon which it was resting its decision.
And yet counsel admits that the question of whether
the duty is governmental or corporate is not here involved except as it might have a bearing in giving :1
liberal construction to the claim statute relative to defective streets and sidewalks. He argues without citing
any authority, that if the duty to maintain streets is
proip.rietary then the court can give such a liberal construction to the claim statute as to nullify its provisions
requiring the filing of a verified claim within 30 days.
Such position is in direct conflict with the holding of
this court in at least two cases, Dahl v. Salt Lake City,
45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 and Moran v.. Salt Lake City, 53
Utah 407, 173 P. 702, in both of which cases a proprietary function was involved, but the court nevertheless
held compliance with the claim statute was a condition
precedent to a right of action against the city. The
Dahl case involved damages resulting from negligent
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aJ

maintenance of a canal. The Moran case involved negli-

J1j

gence in permitting water to escape from a reservoir.

tif1

It should be remembered that as to claims not involving streets and sidewalks the claim statute, 15-7-76,

~ili1

specifically permits amendment of the claim both as to
itemization and verification, and imposes the duty upon
the city to call the lack of itemization and verification
to the attention of the claimant if it is going to insist
upon obedience to those requirements and additional
time to comply must be given the claimant. There is no
such liberality evidenced in the statute in respect to
claims arising from defective streets and sidewalks.
There the language is definite and conclusive. A verified claim must be filed within 30 days and no provision
is made for amendment or for additional time to cure
defects.
CONCLUSION

We respectfully submit that the filing of a verified
claim within the statutory period of 30 days from the
date of the accident is a condition precedent to any
right of action against the city for the consequences of
such accident. An unverified claim is the same as no
claim at all. When the time for filing a claim expired,
and no verified claim was then on file with the city,
plaintiff's right to sue the city ceased to exist. There-
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after she could not state a cause of action. She could
not then amend her claim, nor could she breathe ·the
breath of life into a dead action by a tardy filing of another claim which had no existence when her action was
commenced. Furthermore, we assert that because of
plaintiff's failure to describe the place of her accident
so that the same could be found by resort to the description in the claim, her claim was a nullity. We submit
that the judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's action is right and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assista;nt City Attorneys
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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